Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 2

Article 5

October 1970

Inadequate Assistance of Criminal Trial Counsel: The Standards
for Illinois
Donald L. Dudycha

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Donald L. Dudycha, Inadequate Assistance of Criminal Trial Counsel: The Standards for Illinois , 47 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 218 (1970).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol47/iss2/5

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
INADEQUATE' ASSISTANCE OF CRIMINAL TRIAL COUNSEL:
THE STANDARDS FOR ILLINOIS
Before Gideon v. Wainwright2 applied the sixth amendment to the states,
problems of adequacy of counsel were solely state matters3 involving the interpretation of state constitutions. The Illinois Constitution of 1870 provides that "in
all criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel." Illinois courts have generally interpreted this pro4
vision to mean a duly licensed attorney.
Since Gideon, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
U.S. Constitution has required the states to incorporate the sixth amendment
into their criminal proceedings. The sixth amendment provides that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." A federal standard has thus been applied to state
criminal proceedings.
However, although a federal standard has been applied, the nature of the
standard is still unclear.5 The U.S. Supreme Court has provided only a few
8
7
6
general hints; it has said counsel must be "effective," "competent" and "able."
Such general terms, however, are not of much practical value to lower courts
because they do not specify what actual errors in defense counsel's conduct
require reversing state criminal convictions.

I.

THE PRECEDENTS

With no U.S. Supreme Court cases specifically determining when counsel
is inadequate and with a kaleidoscope of standards for inadequacy among Illinois
decisions, confusion permeates the law. To re-order this confusion, a few of the
major Illinois decisions reversing criminal convictions for inadequacy of counsel
will be examined. 9
1 The writer uses the term "inadequate" throughout the paper to indicate that type of
assistance of counsel which justifies courts in overturning convictions. The term "incompetent" is often used, but is misleading. People v. Dean, 31 IMl. 2d 214, 21 N.E.2d 405
(1964).
2 372 U.S. 333 (1963).

s Except of course when the charges are federal.
2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
People v. Cox, 12 Ill.
People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
6 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
8 Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961).
2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957) ; People v. Gardiner, 303
9 See also, People v. Cox, 12 Ill.
IM. 204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922) ; People v. Shulman, 299 Il.125, 132 N.E. 530 (1921) ; People
2d 305, 223 N.E.2d 110 (1967) ; People v. DeSimone, 9 III. 2d 522, 138
v. Chapman, 36 Mll.
N.E.2d 556 (1956).
4
5
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One of the first Illinois decisions overturning a criminal conviction for
inadequacy of counsel was People v. Blevins.'0 In Blevins, appointed counsel
signed an affidavit stating that (1) they had not had sufficient time to prepare
the case; (2) they had only limited criminal experience; and (3) they could
not reasonably compete with the prosecution since outside attorneys were allowed
to aid the state's attorney. The court reversed Blevins' conviction in order to protect the defendant from undue oppression. The reversing court believed that the
trial court should have exercised "greater caution where the counsel are appointed by the court than where they are his own voluntary selection."' "
In People v. Nitti,12 the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the murder
conviction of an Italian immigrant who could not speak English. Nitti's retained attorney was so unfamiliar with the rules of evidence that the court
questioned whether he was of sound mind. A layman, the court said, could have
examined witnesses better than the defense attorney. Though Nitti's attorney
had a license at the time of the trial, the court considered "the gross incompetency and stupidity of counsel"'18 because of the ignorance of the defendant.
The court observed: "It is quite clear from the record that defendants' interests
would have been much better served with no counsel at all than the one they
had."14
Illinois' landmark decision regarding inadequacy of counsel is People v.
Morris.' 5 There the court reversed a conviction because (1) the appointed defense counsel admitted that he had not discussed the case with the defendant until
the day of the trial, (2) the lawyer had told the defendant that everything was
useless, and (3) counsel overlooked the valid defense of dismissal for want of
prosecution. The court held that overlooking the defense alone did not justify
reversing the defendant's conviction, but that error coupled with lack of preparation and scant attention to the case was sufficient. The court admonished the
public defender to be zealous in the defense of the accused.
The court in Morris discovered a dual standard of care in the precedents:
reversal for inadequacy was possible if counsel were appointed, but not if he
were retained. The court then established a new standard for inadequacy:
(1) actual incompetency of counsel, as reflected by the manner of carrying out his duties as trial attorney; and (2) substantial prejudice resulting therefrom, without which the outcome would probably have
been different. 1
Unfortunately, the court in Morris did not explain whether this new standard
251 Ill.
381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911).
11 Id. at 390, 96 N.E. at 218.

10

12

312 Ill.
73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924).

18 Id. at 89, 143 N.E. at 451.
14 Id. at 89, 143 N.E. at 541.

3 IRl. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
16 Id. at 449, 121 N.E.2d at 817.
15

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

of inadequacy was intended to apply equally to retained and appointed counsel.
Other courts though have cited Morris in support of the dual standard of care
which limits the new standard of inadequacy to appointed counsel.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Birdette17 reversed a conviction
for armed robbery primarily because the defendant continually objected to
representation by a public defender. The court explained:
When it is considered that the public defender was appointed for the
defendant almost a year before his trial, that the assistant public defender who appeared for him admitted that he had never talked to the
defendant, the defendant earnestly protested that he lacked confidence
in the ability of the assistant public defender to properly represent him,
and that the assistant public defender failed to object to any of the crossexamination pertaining to conviction of misdemeanors, we are of the
opinion that the defendant did not receive the fair and impartial trial to
which he is entitled under the constitution of the state of Illinois and
the U.S. Constitution.' 8
The record in People v. Odom,' 9 where the defendant was convicted of
burglary and theft, contained the following errors of appointed counsel which
justified reversal: (1) no preliminary motions, (2) no motions to suppress an
involuntary confession or to instruct the jury to disregard the confession, (3)
no motion to suppress improper exhibits, and (4) no questioning of the obvious
inconsistencies in the evidence presented. After admonishing the public defender
to be zealous in defending the rights of the accused, the court observed:
A defendant's right to aid of counsel is not satisfied by the mere formality of an appointment of an attorney by the court but requires
effective representation through all stages of trial and when such representation is of such low calibre as to deprive him of a fair trial on the
issues, the guarantees of due process are violated.20
The conviction of the defendant in People v. McCoy 2l was reversed for the
following reasons: (1) the defendant's retained counsel introduced evidence
differing from the defendant's theory of the case; (2) the defense attorney
favorably read prosecution evidence to the jury; (3) the attorney failed to move
for mistrial when irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence was presented to
the jury. The court reasoned that while the attorney's conduct did not reduce the
trial to a farce, it was of such low caliber as to deprive the defendant of any
chance of being found not guilty.
In U.S. ex. rel. DeMary v. Pate,22 the federal district court issued a writ of
habeas corpus in a burglary conviction despite the fact that the conviction had
22 Ill. 2d 577, 177 N.E.2d 170 (1961).
Id. at 581-582, 177 N.E.2d at 173.
19 71 Ill. App. 2d 480, 218 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
20 Id. at 487, 218 N.E.2d at 119-120.
21 80 Ill. App. 2d 257, 225 N.E.2d 123 (1967).
22 277 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
17
18
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been affirmed by each level of the courts of Illinois. The facts which the courts
believed warranted the issuing of the writ were as follows: (1) the public defender consulted with the defendant only four times, when continuances were
granted; (2) the attorney did not even ask the defendant to fill out the routine
forms of the public defender's office; (3) he failed to object to the admission of
an involuntary confession; (4) he failed to examine witnesses in a beneficial
manner; and (5) he failed to subpeona or contact a key witness. The court
noted:
In short, prejudicial error resulted at the trial from a total lack of
reasonably conscientious effort directed toward the preparation of a
defense. Thus, in this case there was not that effective assistance of
counsel and that essential
integrity of a trial which due process de23
mands in all cases.
In People v. Jackson24 the court held that the conduct of the trial demonstrated that "defendant's [appointed] counsel did not measure up to that expected of a competent and conscientious trial attorney. '25 Although the court
limited its decision to the facts of the particular case, it did reverse the defendant's conviction for the sale of narcotics. Defense counsel in Jackson's trial
failed to (1) move to suppress evidence, (2) make written motions for change of
venue, (3) prevented the prosecution from leading witnesses, (4) object to
hearsay testimony, (5) make routine pre-trial motions, (6) support the defendant's theory of the case, (7) object to erroneous instructions, and (8) object
to erroneous closing statements by the prosecution.
Illinois courts have thus applied many different standards to a variety of
facts in reversing criminal convictions. Obviously the facts of each case are
extremely important in deciding whether defense counsel has provided adequate
assistance. Certain facts, however, stand out as particularly important.
II. THE

RELEVANT FACTS

The relevant facts regarding defense counsel which justify reversing convictions for inadequacy of counsel may be classified into five interrelated categories: (1) the requirement of certification, (2) the amount of experience, (3)
the extent of trial preparation, (4) the effect of trial tactics, and (5) the method
of selection.
The Requirement of Certification
While the sixth amendment guarantees the criminally accused the right to
assistance of counsel, it does not define the characteristics of adequate assistance
by counsel. The term "counsel" generally means one knowledgeable in the law.
Since the states license those with sufficient legal knowledge to represent clients,
23
24
25

Id. at 53.
96 III. App. 2d 99, 238 N.E.2d 234 (1968).
Id. at 103, 238 N.E.2d at 236-237.
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and presumably no others, a license to practice law is a public representation of
legal knowledge. 26 Assistance of counsel, therefore, means the assistance of a
27
licensed attorney.
A man or woman with a license to practice law is presumed competent to
represent clients by virtue of that license. The court in U.S. ex rel Feeley v. Ragen
explained:
...whenever the court in good faith appoints or accepts the appearance of a member of the bar in good standing to represent a defendant,
the presumption is that such counsel is competent. Otherwise he would
not be in good standing at the bar and accepted by the court. The con28
stitutional requirements have been met as to the necessity of counsel.
Another court, which supported this reasoning, observed: "There are competent,
more competent and most competent lawyers." '29 Despite the implications of the
language in these cases, the presumption that a license means competence is
"rebuttable, not conclusive. '' 30 If the situation were otherwise, no convictions
could ever be reversed for inadequacy of counsel, which is contrary to the
precedents.
The logic of the courts which employ this presumption is questionable.
First, the courts frequently invoke the presumption that a license means competence to avoid discussing the merits of a claim of inadequacy. The argument
that an attorney is competent because he is an attorney thus begs the question.
Second, the presumption unnecessarily increases the burden of proof for a
convict to demonstrate his innocence. After conviction, the burden is on the defendant to prove injustice even without a presumption. Third, the presumption
protects lawyers who may not have served their clients well, instead of protecting the accused from possible injustice. The presumption of innocence can
easily be subverted by the intentional or negligent errors of an attorney.
Lack of knowledge of the law in spite of a license, instead of lack of a
license, seems to justify reversing criminal convictions for inadequacy of
counsel. The requirement of a license may be waived;"' but knowledge of the
law, the root of the license requirement, probably cannot be waived.8 2 Indeed,
Illinois courts have reversed criminal convictions for inadequacy of counsel
where the defense counsel was licensed but demonstrated lack of familiarity with
the rules of evidence, 3 with substantive defenses, 8 4 and with basic criminal procedure.3 6
26

People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924).

27

People v. Cox, 12 III. 2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
U.S. ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1948).
U.S. ex reL Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 1949).
Aehtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1941).
2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
People v. Cox, 12 TH1.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
People v. Nitti, 312 flL 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924); People v. Shulman, 299 IIl. 125,

28

29
80

81
32

3

132 N.E. 530 (1921).
84 People v. Morris, 3 IIl. 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
85 People v. Jackson, 96 I. App. 2d 99, 238 N.E.2d 234 (1962) ; People v. DeSimone,

9 IM.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
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The Amount of Experience
General inexperience or lack of experience in criminal matters are facts
which courts have considered when reversing criminal convictions for inadequacy of counsel. 36 Alone, however, the lack of experience of the defense counsel
does not justify findings of inadequacy. One court explains: "[W]hile it is true
that inexperience may result in incompetence; it is not necessarily equated
'' 7
with it.
3 Nonetheless, Illinois courts frequently mention the duty of the trial
38
court to appoint able and experienced counsel.
Since lack of experience alone does not justify arguments of inadequacy of
counsel, experience may not be a valid factual consideration. Counsel's inexperience may only add weight in support of a court's decision to reverse for
inadequacy. Were inexperience a valid reason for finding inadequacy, new
lawyers, without experience, would have great difficulty gaining entrance to the
profession. The argument of the court in Goodwin v. Swenson goes to the heart
of the manner:
. .that petitioner's trial counsel "is an able lawyer who had had experience in the trial of criminal cases, including the defense of persons
charged with murder" ... is totally beside any relevant point; the
question in a Sixth Amendment case is whether one who may well be
an admittedly able lawyer did or did not render effective assistance in
the defense of an accused under all the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. The most able and competent lawyer in the world cannot render effective assistance in the defense of his client if his lack of
preparation for trial results in his failure to learn of readily available
facts which might have afforded his client a legitimate justiciable defense. Our determination is not an adjudication that [the defense attorney] generally is not a competent and able lawyer; that question is
not at issue. This case determines only that the assistance which ...
[the defense attorney] was able to render in the defense of the petitioner,
under all the facts and circumstances of this case, did not comply with
the command of the Constitution of the United States. 39
-

Thus while inexperience may cause inadequacy, inadequacy is better indicated
by other facts.
The Extent of Trial Preparation
Preparation for trial is an essential element of a defendant's right to
assistance of counsel. 40 Although the trial record is the only evidence considered
on appeal, the record may not indicate the amount of preparation for trial.
Since a defendant's rights may be prejudiced by lack of preparation not reflected in the record, collateral attack of the proceedings via habeas corpus or
86 People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911).
37 People v. Gonzales, 40 Ill.
2d 233, 237, 239 N.E.2d 783, 787 (1968).
88 People v. Morris, 3 Ill.
2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954) ; People v. Jackson, 96 Ill.
App. 2d 99, 238 N.E.2d 234 (1968).
39 287 F. Supp. 166, 182-183 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
40 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
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post-conviction hearing is allowed in order to present evidence supporting claims
of constitutional violations. Three facts relating to the preparation for trial are
particularly significant: (1) lack of time to prepare for trial, (2) lack of effective
meetings between the accused and his attorney, and (3) failure to investigate the
facts.
The first relevant fact regarding preparation is the adequacy of time to prepare for trial. The amount of time an attorney spends preparing for trial does
not necessarily reflect the outcome of the trial since many other factors intervene; but some amount of time is needed to organize and investigate the issues
of a case. Frequently, the quality and depth of preparation, not the amount of
time expended, is the factor determining the outcome of a case. Insufficient time,
however, may prevent adequate preparation and provide the accused with only
pro forma representation. 41 The amount of time necessary to prepare a case will
vary with the difficulty of the factual and legal issues.
The second relevant fact regarding preparation is the effectiveness of pretrial consultation between attorney and client at the trial level. Such consultation is essential to the attorney's knowledge of the facts of the case. If the attorney
does not speak to the defendant or if the client does not communicate the facts
of the case to the attorney, the already difficult problem of trial representation is
made virtually impossible. Convictions have been reversed where no consultations occurred, 42 where consultations were not effective, 43 and where the court
44
failed to deal appropriately with the uncooperative defendant.
The final fact relevant to trial preparation is the extent of the defense
attorney's investigation of the facts. The defense attorney should verify the defendant's story, explore the prosecution's case, and gather evidence supporting
the defendant's case. Convictions have been reversed when the defense attorney
neglected to explore obvious leads or to substantiate obvious defenses. 45
The Efject of Trial Tactics
The conduct of defense counsel during the trial frequently determines
whether the defendant received adequate assistance of counsel. The trial record,
including the defense counsel's motions, objections, and general presentation, is
evaluated when the issue of adequacy is raised: the defense counsel's conduct is
considered on the whole. Although the courts are reluctant to reverse criminal
convictions for inadequacy of counsel, convictions have been reversed where
41 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ; Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) ;
U.S. v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579 (N.D.
Texas 1967) ; People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911).
42 People v. Birdette, 22 Ill. 2d 577, 177 N.E.2d 170 (1961).
43 People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954); U.S. ex rel. DeMary v. Pate,

277 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
44 People v. Chatman, 36 IIl. 2d 305, 223 N.E.2d 110 (1967) ; People v. Birdette, 22 Ill.
2d 305, 177 N.E.2d 170 (1961).
45 U.S. ex rel. DeMary v. Pate, 277 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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counsel contradicted the defendant's theory of the case,48 where counsel had a
conflict of interest, 47 where counsel's conduct was below average, 48 and where
49
counsel failed to make any relevant motions.
Trial mistakes generally do not deprive the defendant of due process of law.
No counsel is perfect. The sixth amendment does not guarantee the defendant
a successful defense. One court explains:
We know that some good lawyer gets beat in every law suit. He made
some mistakes. The printed opinions that line the walls in our offices
bear mute testimony to that fact. His client is entitled to a fair trial,
not a perfect one."'
The courts are reluctant to reverse convictions. Their reluctance reflects
a policy decision directed at keeping "criminals" off the streets and a fear of the
possible consequences of being lenient; but in view of the presumption of innocence, this reluctance is probably not justified.
The first fear which the courts believe justifies their reluctance to reverse
criminal convictions for inadequacy of counsel is that a genuine trial tactic, perhaps an unorthodox defense, may be confused for a blunder by attorneys who
were unfamiliar with the needs of the trial. 51 Why should the tactical opinion
of one lawyer prevail over that of another? Hindsight should not deprecate a
52
genuine trial tactic.
The danger of confusing a genuine trial tactic with a mistake is not great
and is safeguarded by the fact that a convict must prove his counsel performed
inadequately. Nonetheless, defense counsel's acts which do not help the defendant's case or which contradict it, must be questioned. The test of a valid
defense tactic is how it is likely to aid the defendant's case. If the defendant
can prove that a mistake of counsel prejudiced his trial and if his attorney cannot
rationally explain his action, the mistake should not be rationalized as an illconceived but valid trial tactic within a legal system which presumes the innocence of the accused. 53 Although everyone makes mistakes, a criminal
attorney's errors may cost the defendant his life. To protect lawyers from justifiable questioning instead of protecting the accused from the deprivation of life
or liberty seems unjust.
The second fear which the courts believe justifies their reluctance to reverse
convictions is that they may be swamped with litigation if the rules regarding
adequacy of counsel were liberalized. One court elaborates:
46 People v. McCoy, 80 Ill. App. 2d 257, 225 N.E.2d 133 (1967); People v. Jackson,
96 Ill. App. 2d 99, 238 N.E.2d 234 (1968).
47 Porter v. U.S., 298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962).
48 People v. Jackson, 96 Ill. App. 2d 99, 238 N.E.2d 234 (1968).
49 People v. Chatman, 36 fI1. 2d 305, 223 N.E.2d 110 (1967).
50 U.S. ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579. 586 (7th Cir. 1949).
51 People v. Kirkrand, 14 Ill. 2d 86, 150 N.E.2d 788 (1958).
52 People v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968).
53 People v. Chatman, 36 IMI.
2d 305, 223 N.E.2d 110 (1967).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

To allow a prisoner to try the issue of the effectiveness of his counsel
under a liberal definition of the phrase is to give every convict the
privilege of opening a Pandora's box of accusations which
trial courts
54
near large penal institutions would be compelled to hear.
The danger of a flood of litigation probably does not outweigh the judiciary's
responsibility of redressing wrongs. The same court which above elaborated upon
the danger of a flood of litigation recognized that assertions alone will not
justify claims of inadequate counsel; the convict must sufficiently corroborate
facts which would justify a hearing on the issue of inadequacy of counsel. 55
Fictitious and insufficient claims may be screened by requiring a minimum of
factual corroboration in addition to the pleadings. If ultimately necessary, a
reformed administrative or court structure could protect those unjustly convicted because of the inadequacy of their counsel.
The third fear which courts believe justifies their reluctance to reverse convictions is that over-zealous defense attorneys may perpetuate frauds upon the
court. One court explains:
Ordinarily, a defendant who retains counsel of his own selection is
responsible if that counsel does not faithfully serve his interest. Any
other rule would put a premium on pretended incompetence of counsel;
for if the rule were otherwise, a lawyer with a desperate case would
have only to neglect it in order to insure reversal or vacation of the
conviction.56
This same logic may be applied to appointed counsel.
The safeguards against lawyers defrauding the courts are extensive. A
lawyer's self-interest is directly linked to the courts. He is an officer of the
courts. He would lose clients, and therefore his livelihood, if he made the kind
of blunders which would justify an appellate court to reverse a conviction.
In addition to losing his reputation, an over-zealous attorney may subject himself
to disbarment or other sanctions. Also, the lawyer's client would have no guarantee that the courts would not see through the deception or that they would
even reverse the conviction.
Although the safeguards protecting the courts are extensive, few safeguards
insure adequate assistance of counsel to an ignorant client. The agency theory of
representation is not much help. The attorney is an agent who serves two
masters: the courts and the client. As principal, the defendant has the right to
control the actions of the attorney; but the defendant, unknowledgeable in the
law, usually lacks the ability to protect himself. Courts have frequently admonished attorneys to be zealous in the defense of their clients. Only the courts
can pressure lawyers to perform their full duties regarding defendants in criminal
proceedings.
54

Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945).

55 Id.

56 People v. Mitchell, 411 Ill. 407, 407-08, 104 N.E.2d 285, 285 (1952).
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Method of Selection
Illinois courts recognize a double standard of care for defense attorneys
depending upon whether they were appointed or retained. If counsel is appointed,
his errors will be examined for inadequacy; but if counsel is retained, his
errors are not reviewed. Since many cases recognize that appointed counsel may
not be extremely diligent, the first part of the double standard of care is not
usually disputed. However, the second part of the double standard is controversial. This controversy regarding the standard of care of retained counsel is
amply demonstrated by the following statement:
It is only in cases where the attorney for the defendant is one appointed by the court and is inexperienced in the trial of criminal cases,
or where an attorney is stupidly and obstinately recreant in performing his duty toward his client that the court will consider the charge
[of inadequacy]. Furthermore, poor representation
by an attorney of a
57
defendant's own choosing is of no legal moment.
This statement is contradictory: retained counsel's poor representation is of
"legal moment" if a "stupidly and obstinately recreant" retained counsel's representation may be inadequate.
On one hand, some Illinois courts argue that the errors for retained counsel
are totally irrelevant to whether a defendant received due process of law. One
early case argues:
Pierce employed his own counsel in the court below. The record
does not disclose that he was either incompetent or remiss in performing his duties toward plaintiff in error. But even if it were otherwise,
plaintiff in error's contention that he was poorly represented at the time
of trial would be of no legal moment, as his attorney was of his own
choosing.5"
On the other hand, some courts argue that convictions may be overturned when
retained counsel was incompetent or remiss in representing his clients.59
Whether this standard of care for retained counsel is sufficiently similar to the
standard of care for appointed counsel to destroy the double standard is unclear.
The double standard of care for defense counsel depending upon whether
he is appointed or retained is under attack. The precedents supporting the double
standard of care may be unreliable since People v. Morris,6 the foremost Illinois
decision on inadequacy, is ambiguous. When the court in Morris arrived at a
new standard of inadequacy after examining precedents which upheld a double
standard of care, it failed to clarify whether its new standard of inadequacy was
limited to appointed counsel. A subsequent case applied the new standard of
57

People v. Ventura, 415 Ill. 2d 587, 590, 114 N.E.2d 710, 712 (1953).

58 People v. Pierce, 387 Ill. 608, 615, 57 N.E.2d 345, 348 (1944).

59 People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924), is only one example of inadequate
counsel cases reversed where counsel was retained.
60 3 Ill. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
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inadequacy of Morris to retained counsel indicating that no double standard
of care actually exists. 61 The cases citing Morris in support of different standards
of care for appointed and retained counsel may have misconstrued the opinion.
Additionally, the logic of this double standard of care seems questionable. No
reasonable justification for distinguishing between the standard of care of appointed counsel and that of retained counsel exists. Poor persons who cannot
afford to retain counsel should not be given second-class assistance; the rules
of evidence, of criminal law, and of constitutional law do not change when
counsel is appointed. 62 One court agrees: ". . . appointed counsel is held to the
standard of diligence and competence that is to be expected of a lawyer who
is retained to represent his client."' ' Another court, is an even more significant
statement writes: ". . . the Constitution assures a defendant effective representation by counsel whether the attorney is one of his own choosing or courtappointed." 64
III. THE STANDARDS
The standards which courts have used in determining the adequacy of
counsel may be categorized as follows: (1) representation which substantially
prejudiced the defendant, (2) representation by counsel who was actually incompetent, (3) representation which made the trial a sham or a farce, (4)
representation of such low caliber as to be no representation at all, and (5)
representation which lacks fundamental fairness and substantial injustice.
Naturally, these standards are interrelated.
Prejudice
One frequently cited standard of inadequacy which the courts have used to
justify overturning convictions is representation which substantially prejudices
the defendant's case.65 Since almost everything the defense counsel does affects
the case in some way, the defendant may be prejudiced. Several courts use the
adjective "substantial" to describe the amount of prejudice necessary to overturn
a conviction. The problem, according to these courts, is where to draw the line
between "substantial" and "unsubstantial" prejudice. Unfortunately, the courts
have not specifically defined what "substantial" means. One court's opinion indicates the difficulty in applying the substantial prejudice standard:
The fact that a person charged with a crime is poorly defended will not
justify a reversal of the judgment where it is reasonably supported by
the evidence ....
but where the evidence is close, as it is in this case,
61
62

People v. Cox, 12 Ill. 2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).

People v. Smith, 32 Iii. 2d 88, 203 N.E.2d 879 (1965); People v. Danin, 28 Ill. 2d
464, 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963).
63 People v. Kirkrand, 14 Ill. 2d 86, 92, 150 N.E.2d 788, 790 (1958).
64 Porter v. U.S. 298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962).
65 People v. Morris, 3 IM. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954) ; People v. Cox, 12 III. 2d 265,
146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
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and it is clear that the prosecuting attorney has taken advantage of the
accused because he was poorly represented, and the trial court has permitted such advantage to be taken, then we will consider the errors, not
66
withstanding the failure to properly preserve the questions of review.
This court fails to realize that poor representation may make a judgment appear
reasonably supported by the evidence when in fact it is not. Also, the determination of when evidence is "close" presents numerous problems of interpretation.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has clearly warned of the dangers of
fine distinctions regarding what constitutes "substantial prejudice":
To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by . . . [the defendant] . . . as a -result of the court's appointment of . . . counsel .. .
is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in7
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.
Although some showing of injury to the defendant is appropriate, the nature and
authority of this warning should caution courts that "substantial prejudice" may
not be a valid standard of inadequacy.
Incompetency
The second standard of inadequacy, which is frequently associated with the
"substantial prejudice" standard, is representation by counsel who is actually
incompetent. No clear definition of incompetence of counsel exists. On one hand
courts have wondered whether defense counsel was of sound mind. 68 Certainly,
if the courts interpreted actual incompetency to mean insanity, few if any cases
would be overturned. The insanity of the defense counsel would probably
justify overturning a conviction, but reversals are not limited to that situation.
On the other hand, some courts have used "incompetent" as another way of
saying "inadequate. ' 69 The use of the term "incompetence" only obscures the
issues. The term provides no guidance to the courts in determining what is
inadequate representation.
Sham or Farce
The third standard of inadequacy which courts have used to overturn
70
convictions is representation which made the trial a sham or a farce. "[I]t
'1
must be shown that the proceedings were a farce and a mockery of justice. i
What constitutes a sham or farce is unclear even though one case cites this
standard as the Illinois standard. 72 This standard originated in U.S. Supreme
People v. Gardiner, 303 Ill. 204, 206-207, 135 N.E. 422, 423 (1922).
Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1953).
People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924).
69 People v. Morris, 3 Il. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
70 U.S. ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948).
71 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
72 People v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968).
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Court civil rights cases in which the court judged the trial as a totality before
arriving at a conclusion.7 8 This standard relates not to the right to counsel as
much as the right to a fair trial. Therefore, a trial may be a sham or farce even
with adequate representation. Extensive infringement upon the defendant's rights
is probably required to invoke this standard.
Low Caliber-No Representation
The fourth standard of inadequacy is representation of such low caliber
as to amount to no representation at all. Since the sixth amendment insures
the right to assistance of counsel, counsel which amounts to no counsel is a
denial of the right. This standard is frequently linked to the "sham or farce"
standards:
...
his conviction will not be reversed for incompetency unless it can
be said that the representation was of such low caliber as to amount
to no 74representation at all, or that it was such as to reduce trial to a
farce.

While the two standards thus co-exist, conduct which would justify reversal
under this standard need not be as severe as that which would be necessary under
the "sham or farce" theory. The same court elaborates:
While we do not believe that the representation given the defendant in
this case reduced the trial to a farce, we do believe that the caliber of
representation afforded the defendant in this case was such as would
deprive the defendant of any chance of being found not guilty. 75
Nonetheless, representation of such low caliber as to amount to no representation
is still a narrow standard of inadequacy: representation equivalent to no representation is considerably different from representation of low caliber. The
problem for the courts under this standard is determining when representation
is of such low caliber as to equal no representation. Although this standard may
be more restrictive than the "substantial prejudice" standard, the tasks of the
courts using either standard are comparable.
FundamentalFairness-SubstantialJustice
The ultimate standard of inadequacy is the due process clause itself; this
standard pre-empts all others. Was the kind of representation the defendant
received fair and just? If the convicted defendant can prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that his representation was not generally fair and just, due
process would seemingly require that he be granted a new trial. One Illinois
court recognized the strength of this argument:
...even without exploring the issue of whether defendant's representa73 E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 444 (1932).
74

People v. McCoy, 80 Mll. App. 2d 257, 263-264, 225 N.E.2d 123, 126 (1967).

75 Id. at 264, 225 N.E.2d at 126.
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tion was such as to reduce the trial to a farce, it is our opinion that
the total facts, peculiar to this case, disclose a violation of the ideas of
fundamental fairness 76and right which attaches to present day concepts
of due process of law.
Although one court's general feeling of fairness may differ from another's, this
"due process" standard should be used to determine if the defendant received
adequate assistance of counsel until the U.S. Supreme Court established a better
standard. "Fair and just" should probably be liberally construed in order to
preserve the presumption of innocence and protect the rights of defendants
who have been improperly convicted.
DONALD L. DUDYCHA
76 People v. Cox, 12

Il1.2d 265, 272-73, 146 N.E.2d 19, 24 (1957).

